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Does migration serve as an effective channel of regional adjustment to 
idiosyncratic shocks in transition economies? If so, one should find a strong 
relationship between regional unemployment and average wages on the one hand, 
and migration flows on the other. Yet, the evidence from transition economies 
indicates that the efficacy of migration in reducing inter-regional unemployment 
and wage differentials has been low. High wages appear to stimulate overall 
mobility rather than encourage a net immigration, and the effect of unemployment 
is statistically weak and not robust. In addition, the effect of unemployment and 
wages on net migration flows is economically insignificant and the overall level 
of migration has fallen during transition.  
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1  Introduction 
Migration, or labor mobility
1, is an important economic phenomenon. Migrants flow 
from regions with high unemployment and/or low incomes to more prosperous regions, 
attracted by higher wages a nd/or better employment prospects. In this way, migration 
facilitates regional adjustment to adverse shocks: excess labor leaves depressed regions, thus 
gradually diminishing inter-regional differentials in wages and unemployment. In a 
hypothetical economy with perfect factor mobility, regions would adjust to asymmetric 
shocks immediately. When factor mobility is low and prices and wages rigid, however, the 
effects of asymmetric shocks persist and regional economies have to rely on other 
mechanisms, such as inter-regional fiscal redistribution, to deal with them.
2  
The post-communist in Central and Eastern Europe started economic reforms with 
essentially zero (official) unemployment and very egalitarian wage distribution. The 
subsequent transition from central planning to a market economy was associated with a 
dramatic increase in regional disparities. The widening gap between prosperous and depressed 
regions increases the need for regional adjustment, and raises the incentives for workers in 
depressed regions to relocate to regions with more favorable economic conditions. This paper 
assesses the efficacy of inter-regional migration as a channel of regional adjustment in several 
transition economies: the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia and Lithuania. To 
facilitate comparison with (European) market economies, similar results for selected EU 
countries  – Italy, Spain, Portugal and the Netherlands  – are also presented. In particular the 
comparison with Southern European countries should be instructive as  these countries are 
closer to the post-communist transition economies in terms of income levels and labor-market 
developments.  
The analysis relates gross and net migration rates (gross and net migration flows scaled 
by the region’s population) to regional unemployment rates and average wages. The main 
finding is that the efficacy of labor mobility as a channel of regional adjustment to 
idiosyncratic shocks has been rather limited in the transition economies. In general, regional 
                                                   
 
1 The terms migration and labor mobility are used interchangeably in the present paper.  
2 The typical comparison in this context is that between the US and continental Europe. In the US, labor 
mobility is high and plays an important role in reducing unemployment and wage differentials between regions 
(see Blanchard and Katz, 1992). In contrast, continental European countries often display p ersistent economic 
differences between regions such as North and South Italy or East and West Germany. In continental Europe, 
extensive inter-regional redistribution appears counterproductive in that it reduces incentives for migration.    3 
unemployment rate and average wage affect net migration in the expected way  – net 
immigration is positively related to the average wage and negatively to the unemployment 
rate prevailing in the region. However, results obtained with gross migration flows are more 
disappointing. Regions with high wages tend to display both high immigration and emigration 
(rather than high immigration and low emigration). This pattern appears quite universally 
across all transition economies included in the analysis. In some transition economies, the 
effect of unemployment on gross migration flows is similar  – high unemployment discourages 
not only immigration to but also emigration from depressed regions. This pattern implies that 
migration affects predominantly regions with relatively favorable economic conditions. 
Depressed regions, in contrast, show low mobility and thus remain locked in with low average 
wages and high unemployment. Furthermore, the response of net migration flows to regional 
economic conditions is economically small (even though it  often appears statistically 
significant), and migration flows have been declining since the onset of transition.  
After briefly reviewing the theoretical and empirical literature on migration in the 
following section, the data and recent labor market devel opment in transition economies are 
discussed in sections 3 and 4, respectively. The results of the empirical analysis are then 
presented in section 5. Although studying migration is interesting in its own right, analysis of 
labor mobility in transition economies is particularly interesting for two additional reasons. 
First, it is feared that the next round of EU enlargement will bring about massive East-West 
migration flows. Such fears are particularly prominent in Austria and Germany  – the two 
front-line c ountries. Second, the efficacy of migration as a shock-absorbing mechanism will 
have important repercussion for the transition economies’ future membership in the Economic 
and Monetary Union (EMU). If the new entrants continue to be exposed to asymmetric s hocks 
(compared to those affecting the EMU core countries), giving up autonomous monetary 
policy will increase the need for alternative adjustment mechanisms, such as labor mobility. 
These implications are discussed in section 6. Finally, the main conclusions of the present 
paper are summarized the last section.  
   4 
2  The Theories and Empirics of Migration 
Theoretical foundations of modern migration literature
3 were laid by Todaro (1969), and 
Harris and Todaro (1970). Their main insight was that migration is motivated by expected 
earnings differentials, i.e. wage differential between home and destination, adjusted for the 
probability of employment at destination. Accordingly, the higher the wage (the lower the 
unemployment rate) in the region of destination, the greater will be immigration to that 
region. Faini and Venturini (1994) argue, however, that the effect of wages in the region of 
origin need not be linear because migration from poor regions is limited by liquidity 
constraints. With rising home-region wages, emigration from poor regions may in fact 
increase rather than decline as the liquidity constraint ceases to be binding. Only for relatively 
affluent regions do rising wages at home reduce the incentive for migration. Borjas (1987) 
points out that migration responds not only to average wages but also to their dispersion 
reflecting underlying inter-regional differences in rewards to skills. In particular, regions 
(countries) with relatively egalitarian wage distribution will attract primarily low-skilled 
workers, whereas high-skilled workers will choose to migrate to regions with more uneven 
wage distribution, where the returns to skills are higher (Borjas, 1987). Stark (1991) moves 
the focus away from wage differentials. In particular, he explores the role of migration as a 
means for intra-family risk sharing—by moving to regions with imperfectly correlated income 
shocks, the members of a family can reduce the variance of family income. Finally, Burda 
(1995) likens migration to investment decisions under u ncertainty and argues that potential 
migrants may postpone migration because of option value of waiting, which he shows is 
positive. Accordingly, the prospects of an improvement at home and the option to migrate 
later in case of a further deterioration may in fact induce potential migrants to stay put.  
Most of the empirical literature focuses, in line with Harris and Todaro’s insights, on the 
role of wages and employment prospects (typically proxied by unemployment) in explaining 
migration patterns. Often, social and demographic variables, as well as measures of various 
amenities and/or quality of life are included as well. Pissarides and McMaster (1990) find that 
relative unemployment and wages (both expressed as ratios to national mean values) 
significantly affect inter-regional migration in Great Britain, but the resulting regional 
adjustment to shocks is very slow. Jackman and Savouri (1992), who also study British 
migration, obtain a similar finding for unemployment and vacancy rates but find the opposite   5 
result for wages (migration from high to low wage regions). Decressin (1994) in his analysis 
of migration among West German Federal States finds results similar to those of Pissarides 
and McMaster.  
An important aspect of migration is its capacity to facilitate regional adjustment to 
idiosyncratic shocks.
4 Regions hit by permanent demand shocks respond by changes in stocks 
of labor or capital and/or by price (and wage) adjustment. Blanchard and Katz (1992) assess 
these three channels of regional adjustment using US state-level data and conclude that the 
bulk of adjustment occurs via labor mobility (after an initial increase in unemployment) rather 
than capital mobility or price and wage adjustment. Moreover, the adjustment is relatively 
fast, with the effect of a shock disappearing completely after five to seven years. Hence, labor 
in the US is highly mobile and responds readily to idiosyncratic economic shocks. In contrast, 
Decressin and Fatas (1995) find that in Western Europe, the effects of such shocks are 
absorbed mainly by changes in labor-force participation rather than migration. Indeed, 
Bentivogli and Pagano (1999) argue that the responsiveness of migration to unemployment 
and wage differentials is much lower in the EU compared to the US. As a result, wage and 
unemployment differentials are generally greater and more persistent in Europe than in the 
US. This lack of labor mobility is often seen as a potential threat to the stability of the EMU 
(see Eichengreen, 1993, 1998; Braunerhjelm et al., 2000). When idiosyncratic shocks have 
permanent or highly persistent effects, pressure for accommodating policy measures in 
affected regions or countries intensifies. The ability of individual countries in Europe to 
implement such measures is, however, limited  because of the loss of monetary autonomy and 
the constraints on fiscal policy imposed by the Maastricht criteria.  
Migration in transition economies received little attention so far, in part perhaps because 
of lack of suitable data. The main exception is t he former East Germany (see Burda, 1999, 
and Hunt, 2000). In the wake of the reunification, the expected massive outflow of East 
Germans to the Western States did not materialize. On the contrary, by mid 1990s, the flows 
between the former East and West approximately equalized, with the number of migrants 
moving to the East matching that leaving for West Germany. The lack of massive migration is 
often attributed to the rapid (partial) convergence of wages in the new Federal States to the 
West German level a nd the transfers from the West (see Sinn, 1999), or the expectation of 
such convergence (Burda, 1995). The empirical analysis of Burda (1999) and Hunt (2000) 
                                                                                                                                                               
3 See Borjas (1994), and Ghatak and Levine (1998) for recent surveys of literature.    6 
confirms the importance of wage and unemployment differentials, but also highlights the 
generally low labor mobility in Germany (East and West).  
 
3  Data 
Migration data for several transition economies were collected: the Czech Republic, 
Hungary, Lithuania, Poland, and Slovakia. To facilitate comparison with (European) market 
economies, the analysis was  also performed for the following EU countries: Italy, Spain, 
Portugal and the Netherlands. Due to data limitations, the periods covered by the data differ 
somewhat. The data for the transition economies cover between three and seven years during 
1990s. The data for the EU countries span from late 1980s to mid 1990s, covering between 
seven and twelve years. The data differ also in terms of size of the regions. In general, regions 
in transition economies are smaller, with average population ranging between 66 thousand in 
Lithuania to 790 thousand in Poland. In contrast, average population of regions in the EU 
countries ranges between 1.4 million in The Netherlands and 4.3 million in Spain. Clearly, 
smaller regions offer better approximation of the local labor  market conditions. On the other 
hand, data pertaining to smaller regions also capture greater fraction of migration flows that 
are not labor-market related  – e.g. moving from the city to the suburbs, or moving between 
two adjacent districts without changing employment. 
The analysis utilizes data on overall immigration and emigration per region (without 
distinguishing the regions of origin or destination of migrants). The data are based on records 
from municipal population registers. Obviously, this may cause problems when interpreting 
the results, because population migration does not distinguish between employment-related 
migration and non-labor migration (because of marriage or divorce, education, retirement, and 
the like). This, however, is a general problem of most migration studies, as typically only 
population-migration data are available. Parikh and van Leuvensteijn (2000) compare 
population and labor migration data for Germany and find that regressions that use population 
and labor migration yield similar results, as long as migration figures are normalized by 
population and labor force, respectively.  
 
                                                                                                                                                               
4 This role of migration is emphasized by the optimum currency area literature, as initiated by Mundelll 
(1961) and McKinnon (1963).    7 
4  Labor Market Developments in Transition Economies  
The transition from central planning to a market economy had dramatic labor-market 
repercussions. The formerly socialist countries set out to reform their economies with 
essentially no (official) unemployment and very egalitarian distribution of wages. In the 
course of transition, overall unemployment as well as regional disparities in unemployment 
and wages increased rapidly, as Table 1 shows.  
Insert Table 1 about here.  
The pattern of regional distribution of unemployment and wages appears to be strongly 
persistent: the correlation coefficients between regional unemployment rates (wages) in 1991 
and 1996 are 0.52 (0.70) for the Czech Republic, 0.45 (0.80) for Slovakia, 0.92 (0.93) for 
Poland and 0.74 (0.85) for Hungary (between 1991 and 1997). Hence, regions that were 
stricken by high unemployment and low wages at the outset of transition in general remained 
economically depressed five years later. In addition, unemployment rates and average wages 
are negatively correlated across districts, with the following correlation coefficients obtained 
for 1996:  –0.10 for the Czech Republic,  –0.68 for Slovakia,  –0.62 for Hungary and –0.41 for 
Poland.  
In the presence of substantial regional disparities, workers in depressed regions stand to 
gain by moving to regions with higher wages and better employment opportunities. If this 
mechanism is effective, migration will eventually smooth away the effects of idiosyncratic 
shocks. Nevertheless, even with effective migration response to economic incentives, one 
may still observe persistent wage and unemployment differentials in equilibrium. This can be 
the case when high  unemployment is matched by high wages, thus resulting in zero 
equilibrium migration (this, however, implies positive correlation between unemployment and 
wages, which is not the case in transition economies). Nevertheless, despite sizeable and 
growing gap  between prosperous and depressed regions, migration in transition economies in 
fact declined in the course of reforms (see Table 1). This may be attributed to rising nation-
wide unemployment and worsening employment prospects associated with it (as argued  by 
Decressin, 1994). Because of the different size of regions, direct comparison of the extent of 
labor mobility in transition economies and Western European countries is not possible (in 
general, the smaller the regions, the greater should be the extent o f migration across regional 
boundaries). Nevertheless, when considering the smaller size of regions, labor mobility in 
transition countries does not appear high in international comparison.    8 
 
5  Migration as Adjustment to Shocks  
Migration is one of the principal mechanisms (alongside capital mobility and price 
flexibility) for absorbing adverse effects of asymmetric shocks. Consider a region hit by a 
permanent negative demand shock. As a result of such shock, unemployment rises and wages 
fall in the region. T he region can adjust to the effects of this shock in a number of ways. First, 
worsening labor-market situation may induce the region’s residents to leave and take up 
employment in regions with better economic conditions. Second, lower wages and plentiful 
labor may induce new firms to move into the region. And finally, the relative price level can 
adjust (either by falling wages and prices or by currency depreciation, if the region has its 
own currency) sufficiently so that demand for the region’s products r ises again. This paper 
investigates the efficacy of the first channel of regional adjustment  – migration  – and its 
responsiveness to regional economic characteristics: unemployment rates and average wages. 
The dependent variable is gross and net migration, both normalized by population  – so 
that the dependent variables measure migration rates rather than flows. The data only record 
the total number of migrants (inbound and outbound) per district, without identifying the 
regions of origin or destination. Gross inflow and outflow rates are strongly correlated—with 
correlation coefficients of 0.78 for the Czech Republic, 0.77 for Slovakia and 0.92 for Poland 
(the correlations are measured over the entire available period for each country, only net 
migration flows are available for Hungary). This implies that if some variables affect both 
inflows and outflows in the same direction, the coefficients estimated for net immigration rate 
may be biased (see Bauer and Zimmerman, 1995). Therefore, it is important to consider both 
gross and net migration. Gross migration flows appear strongly persistent (much more so than 
net migration), the correlation coefficients for gross migration rates in 1992 and 1996 are 
between 0.6 and 0.8 for the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Poland.  
The analysis covers between three and seven years for the transition countries and 
between seven and twelve years for the EU countries (the choice of periods is mandated 
primarily by data availability). Observations for individual years are pooled together. All 
regressions include year dummies, with the first available year as the reference year. The 
results are reported in Tables 2 through 6. The focus of the analysis is on the impact of 
regional unemployment rates and average wages on inter-regional  migration. Therefore, the 
most parsimonious regressions are estimated only with these two variables. The wage is   9 
normalized by the nation-wide average wage to eliminate the effects of wage inflation. Both 
unemployment and wages are lagged by one year because of their possible endogeneity in 
migration. These results are reported in the first panel of each Table.  
Clearly, many other factors besides unemployment and wages affect migration: the 
quality of infrastructure and amenities, the regions’ social, cultural and demographic 
characteristics, and the like. Therefore, I also estimated regressions containing additional 
demographic and socio-economic variables. Regressions reported in the second panel of each 
Table contain also the (log of) population density  (as a measure of urbanization, as well as 
congestion), and a dummy variable for suburban districts (i.e. those immediately adjacent to 
city districts
5). Finally, the regressions reported in the third panel of each Table (except for 
Lithuania, for which the additional data were not available) contain further socio-economic 
and demographic variables: a measure of the size of the nascent private sector proxied by the 
number of small private unincorporated entrepreneurs (excluding farmers) as the percentage 
of  population; employment in the industry and agriculture, as the percentage of total 
employment; the share of persons with university education; the share of Roman Catholics (in 
the Czech Republic and Slovakia); the share of persons above retirement age; and the shares 
of main ethnic minorities—the Romany (Gypsies) in the Czech and Slovak Republics and the 
Hungarian minority in Slovakia.  
The results suggest that although unemployment rates and average wages indeed affect 
migration patterns in transition economies, the pattern is only imperfectly consistent with the 
role of migration as a mechanism of regional adjustment to shocks. Migration is most 
effective as a channel of regional adjustment when gross (and net) immigration is positively 
related to average  wages and negatively to unemployment, while gross emigration is positive 
related to unemployment and negatively to average wages. However, this is not the pattern 
that obtains for migration in the transition economies. On the one hand, unemployment and 
average wages have the correct signs in regressions with net migration and are usually at least 
marginally significant. Hence, it appears that high wages and low unemployment indeed 
encourage net immigration. On the other hand, unemployment apparently discourages overall 
migration (except in Poland), i.e. not only immigration but also emigration. Similarly, high 
wages tend to be associated with higher overall migration, inbound and outbound. Hence, 
                                                   
5 The city districts (along with the names of their respective suburban districts) are  Prague ( Prague  East 
and  Prague  West),  Brno ( Brno-vicinity),  Plzen ( Plzen  South,  Plzen  North and  Rokycany) and  Ostrava ( Frydek 
Mystek,  Karvina and  Novy Jicin) in the Czech Republic;  Bratislava ( Bratislava-vicinity) and  Kosice ( Kosice-
vicinity) in Slovakia; and Budapest (Pest) in Hungary.    10 
instead of facilitating relocation of labor from depressed districts to the more prosperous ones, 
migration largely involves mobility of labor among regions with relatively favorable 
economic conditions.  
Insert Tables 2 through 6 about here. 
The additional socio-economic and demographic variables appear to exert important 
effect on migration as well. Urbanization (measured by the log of population density) 
discourages net immigration (possibly because of congestion). Its effect on gross flows differs 
across the individual countries though. The dummy for suburbs turns out to be quite important 
in explaining migratory flows  – suburban districts tend to have higher overall migration and 
receive a net inflow of migrants.  
The number of entrepreneurs in the region, intended as a measure of the emerging private 
sector, is s ignificantly and positively related to the inflow and outflow of migrants (except in 
Poland). It also appears to encourage net immigration. Hence, districts with a large and 
vibrant private sector tend to display higher labor mobility and attract a net migration inflow. 
This result is similar to that obtained for average wages, and may indeed reflect the same 
underlying pattern  – the nascent private sector likely attracts more productive and better 
skilled workers, and these workers are in turn more mobile  relative to the rest of the 
population. As with wages, however, the bulk of migration flows again appears to be among 
districts with relatively favorable economic conditions. In order to better facilitate regional 
adjustment, entrepreneurial activity should encourage immigration and discourage rather than 
encourage emigration. The only transition economy where this appears to be the case is 
Poland, where the effect of entrepreneurial activity on immigration is insignificant and the 
effect on emigration is negative.  
Hence, the evidence suggests that migration flows in transition economies indeed respond 
to regional differences in unemployment rates and wages. However, the pattern of migration 
is only imperfectly consistent with migration facilitating regional adjustment to idiosyncratic 
shocks. The positive effect of wages on the immigration inflow and emigration implies that 
higher average wages are associated with greater overall mobility in prosperous regions rather 
than with net flow of labor from poor regions to those with more favorable conditions. Low 
mobility in depressed regions may be attributed to several factors. First, there are fixed costs 
of migration (because of search and information costs, costs of moving, etc.). The costs may 
be sufficiently high to prevent low-wage earners and the unemployed from migrating. Second, 
employment prospects for high-skilled labor may be generally better so that the pool of   11 
migrants may consist largely of high-skilled workers earning relatively high wages. Finally, 
the low mobility in depressed regions may be due to structural factors. If workers’ human 
capital is not transferable to different industries, then the unemployed workers in regions that 
were traditionally dominated by communist-era industries may have l ittle options other than 
staying put.  
Even more importantly, the potential effect of labor mobility on reducing regional 
differences in unemployment and wages is rather small. According to the regressions 
estimated with unemployment, wages, population density and dummies for suburbs, as 
reported in the middle panels of Tables 2 through 6, a ten percentage-point increase in the 
unemployment rate should give rise to a marginal net outflow between 0.03 and 0.25 
percentage point of a district’s population annually (0.66 if the insignificant coefficient 
obtained for Lithuania is considered). Similarly, an increase of average wages by 10 
percentage points relative to the national average is associated with an increase in the annual 
net migrant inflow between 0.03 and 0.08 percentage point (recall that wages are expressed in 
ratios to national average rather than in levels or logs). With the pace of adjustment this slow, 
it is not at all surprising that regional differences in unemployment rates and wages in the 
transition economies have been highly persistent.  
Finally, it is instructive to compare transition economies with market economies, 
especially those in Southern Europe that are closer to post-communist countries in terms of 
incomes levels and labor-market d evelopments. Tables 7 through 10 present regression results 
obtained for Italy, Spain, Portugal and the Netherlands. The results are mixed. Italy
6 and 
Portugal indeed display the desirable pattern of migration. In particular, gross immigration is 
positively related to average wages and negatively to unemployment, while gross emigration 
is positively related to unemployment (the effect of average on gross emigration appears 
negative for Portugal and positive for Italy but the coefficients are insignificant f or both 
countries). The effects of unemployment and wages on net migration are also consistent with 
migration facilitating regional adjustment to shocks and strongly significant.  
The results for Spain and the Netherlands are more disappointing. Unemployment seems 
to discourage gross migration flows in Spain, although its effect on net migration has the 
correct sign. The effect of average wages appears insignificant or with incorrect sign for gross 
                                                   
6 The result for Italy is rather surprising, as Italy is often brought up as an example of a country with very 
immobile labor force and persistent economic differences across regions. Nevertheless, even though the 
coefficients are significant and have the correct signs, the estimated effects are economically small.    12 
as well as net flows. In the Netherlands, unemployment appears to encourage overall 
migration whereas average wages discourage it.
7  
Insert Tables 7 through 10 about here. 
 
6  Implications for EU and EMU Enlargement 
Recently, mobility of Eastern European labor received considerable attention also for a 
different reason  – accession to the European Union will eventually introduce the possibility 
for East Europeans to seek employment throughout the Union. Some current EU member 
countries, especially the  frontline countries, Austria and Germany, are concerned about the 
prospects of a large influx of migrants from the East. In particular, it is feared that scores of 
migrants will be attracted by high Western European wages, increasing unemployment and 
driving down wages of the incumbent workers (see Bauer and Zimmermann, 1999, and Boeri 
and Bruecker, 2000, for assessment of potential post-enlargement migration).  
While the empirical results presented in this paper do not facilitate a forecast of post-
enlargement migration, several lessons can be drawn. First, labor mobility  in the accession-
candidate countries has been low and falling, despite often large (and increasing) wage and 
unemployment differentials across regions. Second, migration appears to occur chiefly among 
relatively prosperous regions rather than from depressed ones to those with favorable 
economic conditions. This may be because a large fraction of migrants are high-wage earners. 
If this pattern continues after the candidate countries’ entry to the EU, free mobility of labor 
may actually have adverse effects f or the new entrants (and positive effects for the current 
members) in as much as it may involve mainly migration of high-skilled workers. Finally, the 
response of net migration to regional economic characteristics, while statistically significant, 
is not s ignificant in economic sense. Indeed, even sizeable differentials in average wages and 
unemployment rates give rise only to very modest net migration flows.  
The present paper also yields some implications with respect to the eventual participation 
of the  transition economies in the EMU, following their accession to the EU. It is envisaged 
that the new members will join the EMU in due course after becoming members of the EU. 
This, however, will be an important policy decision, with potentially far-reaching  economic 
                                                   
7 This results for the Netherlands may reflect the fact that workers tend to commute to work, often over 
considerable distances, rather than migrate.   13 
implications for the accession countries as well as the incumbent EMU members (in 
particular, premature admission of new members may undermine the stability of the union as 
a whole). In the course of intensifying integration, the accession countries should eventually 
become exposed to similar shocks as the core EMU countries. However, this process can be 
lengthy and in the meantime the accession countries are likely to continue experiencing 
shocks that are different from those affecting the EMU core. Indeed, Frenkel et al. (1999) 
suggest that between 1992 and 1998, the shocks affecting the accession-candidate countries 
were little correlated with those experienced by Germany and France (some of the correlation 
coefficients even turned out to be negative.  
Joining the EMU implies relinquishing autonomy over monetary policy as well as 
submitting to important restrictions on fiscal policy (due to the Maastricht criteria imposing 
ceilings on public deficit and debt). Hence, the set of tools available for dealing with 
asymmetric shocks will be severely reduced by EMU membership. If the accession countries 
are exposed to asymmetric shocks and their labor markets cannot adjust easily enough to such 
shocks, then early participation in the EMU may not be the o ptimum exchange-rate regime for 
these countries. By retaining their separate currencies, the accession countries will be better 
able to cope with idiosyncratic shocks. Indeed, given the low responsiveness of labor mobility 
to regional unemployment and wages, it appears that the candidate countries may not be well 
equipped to deal with adverse effects of asymmetric shocks. Transitional barriers to labor 
mobility in the wake of the enlargement would in fact only aggravate this problem. Hence, an 
early entry t o the EMU would make the monetary union more fragile and be potentially 
costly—both in economic and political terms.  
 
7  Conclusions 
Labor mobility can serve as an important channel for regional adjustment to idiosyncratic 
shocks. Emigration from depressed r egions helps reduce inter-regional differentials in 
unemployment rates and average wages. This paper assesses the efficacy of migration as a 
channel of regional adjustment in several post-communist countries in transition. Economic 
reforms have had largely asymmetric repercussions in these countries, resulting in large and 
persistent unemployment and wage differentials across regions, thus increasing the need for 
effective regional adjustment. However, the efficacy of labor mobility as a channel of regional 
adjustment has been limited in the transition economies. While migration indeed responds to   14 
inter-regional wage differentials, its responsiveness to unemployment is more limited (and 
less robust to changes in regression specification). Moreover, the effect of wage differentials 
on migration is only partially consistent with regional adjustment occurring via migration. 
Although wages have a positive effect on net migration, they are positively correlated with 
overall mobility—both gross immigration and emigration. Hence, depressed regions 
experience low overall mobility (inbound and outbound) rather than an outflow of migrants. 
The effect of unemployment is, to some extent, similar (although as emphasized above it is 
less robust to changes in regression specifications). When comparing post-communist 
transition economies with Southern European countries, migration patterns in Italy and 
especially Portugal appear much more effective in facilitating regional adjustment.  
Yet, gross migration flows in transition  countries were not negligible  – in 1996, gross 
migration flows (as a percentage of the countries’ populations) ranged between 0.6% in 
Slovakia and 2.3% in Lithuania. However, gross immigration and emigration are strongly 
correlated and hence the resulting  net migration is tiny. This pattern can also be traced in the 
regression results presented above—while several socio-economic and demographic factors 
significantly affect gross migration flows, they often have a similar effect on inflows and 
outflows. Even though net migration is found to respond to regional economic characteristics, 
the effects are economically small and large inter-regional differentials in unemployment and 
average wages only give rise to modest net migration flows.  
The pattern of labor  mobility prevailing in transition economies has several important 
implications. First, regional differentials in unemployment and wages will not be smoothed 
away by migration easily. An appropriate policy response may be needed in order to avert 
creation o f new  Mezziogiorni. Second, given the low labor mobility in the accession 
countries, it seems unlikely that there will be a massive East-West migration flows in the 
wake of the next EU enlargement. East Europeans do not move readily even within their own 
countries, despite sizeable wage and unemployment differentials. Although wage differentials 
with respect to the current EU members are larger, so are migration costs and informal (e.g. 
linguistic and cultural) barriers to migration. Third, because of the l ow efficacy of migration 
in smoothign away inter-regional differentials in unemployment and wages, an early 
membership in the EMU is not necessarily an optimal policy choice for the accession 
countries. EMU membership stipulates loss of autonomous monetary policy and imposes 
important limitations on counter-cyclical fiscal policy. As the transition countries will likely   15 
continue to face different shocks than the EMU core, at least in medium term, they may 
indeed benefit from retaining the option to adjust their exchange rates.  
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Table 1A Labor-Market Developments and Migration: Czech Republic  
  1991  1992  1993  1994  1995  1996  1997  1998 
Unemployment  4.62  2.9  3.89  3.38  3.08  3.79  5.63  7.81 
Standard Deviation  1.88  1.41  1.94  1.73  1.7  1.91  2.53  3.06 
Coeff. Of Variation [%]  40.7%  48.6%  49.9%  51.2%  55.2%  50.3%  44.9%  39.2% 
Wages [CZK]  3745  4571  5551  6411  7661  9056  9757  11239 
Standard Deviation  234  361  446  575  656  786  958  1365 
Coeff. of Variation [%]  6.2%  7.9%  8.0%  9.0%  8.6%  8.7%  9.8%  12.1% 
Gross Migration [%]  n.a.  1.26  1.15  1.01  1.00  0.94  0.98  0.98 
Standard Deviation    0.30  0.27  0.27  0.28  0.28  0.33  0.41 
Maximum    2.43  2.31  2.29  2.33  2.33  2.57  3.32 
Minimum    0.82  0.73  0.62  0.57  0.57  0.57  0.59 
 
Table 1B Labor-Market Developments and Migration: Slovakia  
  1991  1992  1993  1994  1995  1996  1997  1998 
Unemployment  12.89  11.82  16.57  17.7  14.56  14.56  n.a.  n.a. 
Standard Deviation  3.23  3.65  4.91  5.89  4.79  5.06     
Coeff. of Variation [%]  25.1%  30.9%  29.6%  33.3%  32.9%  34.8%     
Wages [SKK]  3635  4185  5026  5747  6640  7267  n.a.  n.a. 
Standard Deviation  163  323  408  529  664  862     
Coeff. of Variation [%]  4.5%  7.7%  8.1%  9.2%  10.0%  11.9%     
Gross Migration [%]  n.a.  0.85  0.82  0.73  0.62  0.61  n.a.  n.a. 
Standard Deviation    0.21  0.21  0.20  0.18  0.23     
Maximum    1.51  1.41  1.39  1.23  1.40     
Minimum    0.42  0.44  0.34  0.29  0.28     
 
Table 1C Labor-Market Developments: Poland 
  1991  1992  1993  1994  1995  1996  1997  1998 
Unemployment  12.7  14.9  18.2  n.a.  16.8  14.9  11.9  12.0 
Standard Deviation  3.6  4.4  5.6  n.a.  5.1  4.8  4.2  4.1 
Coeff. of Variation [%]  28.1%  29.5%  31.0%  n.a.  30.3%  32.4%  35.3%  34.5% 
Wages [PLZ]  167.73  269.15  358.39  479.2  632.6  797.5  965.7  1115.2 
Standard Deviation  13.07  23.31  35.22  54.0  70.5  87.5  109.7  126.9 
Coeff. of Variation [%]  7.8%  8.7%  9.8%  11.3%  11.1%  11.0%  11.4%  11.4% 
Gross Migration [%]  n.a.  1.3  1.2  n.a.  n.a.  1.1  1.1  n.a. 
Maximum  n.a.  1.7  1.6  n.a.  n.a.  1.5  1.6  n.a. 
Minimum  n.a.  0.7  0.7  n.a.  n.a.  0.7  0.7  n.a. 
   19 
Table 1D Labor-Market Developments: Hungary 
  1991  1992  1993  1994  1995  1996  1997  1998 
Unemployment  9.7  9.2  13.1  11.4  11.3  11.6  11.5  10.1 
Standard Deviation  3.5  3.2  3.8  3.4  3.4  4.0  4.2  3.9 
Coeff. of Variation [%]  35.5%  35.2%  29.1%  29.5%  30.3%  34.0%  36.0%  38.8% 
Wages [HUF]    20,315.8  24,753.8  30,960.7  36,200.9  43,080.6  52,458.3  61,338.2 
Standard Deviation    2,180.3  2,561.1  3,275.4  4,032.6  5,046.9  6,771.0  8,619.4 
Coeff. of Variation [%]    10.7%  10.3%  10.6%  11.1%  11.7%  12.9%  14.1% 
Net Migration [%]                 
Maximum        -0.5  -0.6  -0.4  -0.6  -0.5 
Minimum        1.4  1.4  1.2  1.5  1.5 
 
Table 1E Labor-Market Developments: Lithuania 
  1996  1997  1998  1999 
Unemployment  7.84  6.49  7.65  9.70 
Standard Deviation  3.24  2.35  2.82  3.30 
Coeff. of Variation [%]  41.3%  36.3%  36.9%  34.0% 
Wages [LIT]  532.59  672.39  807.57  849.43 
Standard Deviation  126.63  144.78  153.21  158.43 
Coeff. of Variation [%]  23.8%  21.5%  19.0%  18.7% 
Gross Migration [%]  2.26  2.20  1.77  1.58 
Maximum  4.73  4.63  4.04  3.29 
Minimum  0.82  0.94  0.61  0.58 
 
Table 1F Labor-Market Developments: Netherlands 
  1988  1989  1990  1991  1992  1993  1994  1995 
Unemployment  9.76  8.73  7.69  5.88  5.98  6.58  7.11  7.33 
Standard Deviation  1.76  1.55  1.79  0.95  1.06  1.01  0.96  1.02 
Coeff. of Variation [%]  18.0%  17.8%  23.3%  16.2%  17.8%  15.4%  13.5%  14.0% 
Wages [ECU]  1995.95  2004.19  2090.13  2185.16  2317.98  2505.45  2585.95  2709.06 
Standard Deviation  45.67  46.90  50.77  51.48  59.03  64.22  60.52  64.84 
Coeff. of Variation [%]  2.3%  2.3%  2.4%  2.4%  2.5%  2.6%  2.3%  2.4% 
Gross Migration [%]  1.61  1.66  1.61  1.59  1.54  1.53  1.53  1.53 
Maximum  2.74  2.75  2.66  2.66  2.71  2.76  2.82  2.73 
Minimum  1.11  1.12  1.12  1.09  0.95  0.98  0.95  0.98 
Note: All observations for Flevoland were dropped because of data problems.   20 
Table 1G Labor-Market Developments: Italy 
  1988  1989  1990  1991  1992  1993  1994  1995 
Unemployment  11.31  10.40  9.35  9.13  8.75  10.49  11.54  12.26 
Standard Deviation  6.34  6.44  6.16  5.80  4.68  5.48  6.20  6.95 
Coeff. of Variation [%]  56.0%  61.9%  65.9%  63.5%  53.4%  52.3%  53.7%  56.7% 
Wages [ECU]  1579.92  1747.42  1928.57  2088.01  2126.98  1913.33  1895.32  1785.86 
Standard Deviation  139.21  164.17  178.69  190.60  196.74  169.94  173.72  158.35 
Coeff. of Variation [%]  8.8%  9.4%  9.3%  9.1%  9.2%  8.9%  9.2%  8.9% 
Gross Migration [%]  0.53  0.56  1.86  0.49  0.53  0.50  0.49  0.50 
Maximum  1.30  1.36  3.06  1.14  1.24  1.12  1.20  1.22 
Minimum  0.33  0.32  0.18  0.28  0.35  0.30  0.31  0.31 
 
Table 1H Labor-Market Developments: Spain 
  1987  1988  1989  1990  1991  1992  1993  1994 
Unemployment  19.08  18.63  16.39  15.39  15.16  16.96  20.90  22.95 
Standard Deviation  5.27  4.84  5.24  5.45  5.28  5.21  5.49  5.21 
Coeff. of Variation [%]  27.6%  26.0%  32.0%  35.4%  34.8%  30.7%  26.2%  22.7% 
Wages [ECU]  956.92  1130.42  1396.54  1676.73  1956.65  2212.69  2098.76  2033.41 
Standard Deviation  107.09  119.53  130.15  148.64  153.65  185.62  189.49  172.41 
Coeff. of Variation [%]  11.2%  10.6%  9.3%  8.9%  7.9%  8.4%  9.0%  8.5% 
Gross Migration [%]  0.45  0.57  0.65  0.64  0.38  0.53  0.55  0.60 
Maximum  1.44  2.25  2.26  1.47  1.11  1.28  1.17  1.00 
Minimum  0.19  0.27  0.32  0.41  0.21  0.28  0.29  0.34 
 
Table 1I Labor-Market Developments: Portugal 
  1986  1987  1988  1989  1990  1991  1992  1993 
Unemployment  8.30  6.70  6.17  5.06  4.57  4.16  3.87  5.36 
Standard Deviation  3.93  3.30  4.26  3.32  2.66  2.30  1.76  1.82 
Coeff. of Variation [%]  47.37  49.30  68.99  65.62  58.28  55.27  45.52  33.91 
Wages [ECU]  402.92  435.47  471.27  518.11  601.05  721.68  859.86  851.72 
Standard Deviation  58.37  48.49  64.86  75.12  56.60  69.16  87.61  89.79 
Coeff. of Variation [%]  14.49  11.13  13.76  14.50  9.42  9.58  10.19  10.54 
Gross Migration [%]  0.20  0.14  0.20  0.50  0.54  0.18  0.33  n.a. 
Maximum  0.65  0.29  0.56  1.10  1.24  0.50  1.02  n.a. 
Minimum  0.08  0.03  0.09  0.04  0.11  0.07  0.09  n.a. 
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Table 2 Determinants of Inter-regional Migration: Czech Republic 1992 - 1998 
  Inflows  Outflows  Net Inflows  Inflows  Outflows  Net Inflows  Inflows  Outflows  Net Inflows 
  (1)    (2)    (3)    (4)    (5)    (6)    (7)    (8)    (9)   
Constant  0.792  (4.59)  0.772 (7.04)  0.020  (0.14) 0.670  (3.97)  0.678  (5.54) -0.009  (0.07)  0.951 (3.20)  1.068  (4.80) -0.126  (0.52) 
Unempl. Rate (lagged)  -0.039  (4.40)  -0.016 (2.94)  -0.023  (3.65) -0.032  (4.32)  -0.012  (2.36) -0.020  (3.53)  -0.007 (1.14)  -0.005  (1.02) -0.002  (0.44) 
Wage Ratio (lagged)  0.692  (3.75)  0.535 (4.94)  0.156  (1.07) 1.390  (5.89)  1.016  (6.30) 0.376  (2.26)  0.840 (3.76)  0.458  (3.45) 0.385  (2.10) 
Population Density [log]          -0.133  (6.54)  -0.088  (5.54) -0.046  (3.11)  -0.129 (4.47)  -0.038  (1.61) -0.091  (4.03) 
Suburb          0.315  (5.97)  0.163  (4.91) 0.152  (4.57)  0.361 (7.70)  0.209  (6.93) 0.152  (4.66) 
Entrepreneurs                    0.020 (2.51)  0.011  (1.96) 0.009  (1.67) 
Industrial Employment                    -0.007 (3.24)  -0.005  (3.54) -0.002  (1.32) 
Agricult. Employment                    0.005 (1.13)  0.016  (5.70) -0.012  (3.51) 
University Educated                    0.003 (0.27)  0.013  (1.79) -0.010  (1.03) 
Catholics                    -0.008 (7.40)  -0.007  (9.22) -0.001  (1.38) 
Retirees                    0.021 (3.29)  -0.005  (1.00) 0.026  (4.78) 
Romany Minority                    0.075 (1.26)  0.186  (4.07) -0.111  (2.37) 
Dummy 1993  -0.175  (3.71)  -0.097 (2.25)  -0.078  (2.75) -0.161  (3.73)  -0.088  (2.27) -0.073  (2.44)  -0.121 (3.29)  -0.043  (1.36) -0.078  (2.53) 
Dummy 1994  -0.254  (5.71)  -0.262 (6.44)  0.009  (0.33) -0.226  (5.44)  -0.243  (6.54) 0.018  (0.62)  -0.203 (5.47)  -0.211  (6.72) 0.010  (0.31) 
Dummy 1995  -0.275  (6.13)  -0.293 (7.36)  0.018  (0.66) -0.229  (5.35)  -0.261  (7.16) 0.033  (1.11)  -0.229 (6.26)  -0.283  (10.09) 0.055  (1.85) 
Dummy 1996  -0.328  (6.97)  -0.364 (9.31)  0.037  (1.21) -0.284  (6.32)  -0.334  (9.36) 0.052  (1.59)  -0.293 (7.60)  -0.360  (12.79) 0.068  (2.13) 
Dummy 1997  -0.249  (4.93)  -0.339 (8.80)  0.090  (2.63) -0.195  (4.10)  -0.302  (8.32) 0.107  (3.09)  -0.215 (5.10)  -0.292  (9.44) 0.076  (2.27) 
Dummy 1998  -0.146  (2.28)  -0.287 (7.35)  0.142  (2.93) -0.102  (1.77)  -0.257  (6.94) 0.155  (3.32)  -0.193 (3.84)  -0.267  (7.41) 0.074  (1.75) 
Adj. R
2  0.170    0.311   0.099  0.348    0.403  0.182    0.536   0.612  0.262   
Notes: Number of observations: 526 (76 districts, average population 135,900 in 1994). T -statistics (heteroskedasticity robust) are reported in parentheses. The dependent 
variables are the gross inflow and outflow rates and net inflow rate as a percentage of the region’s end-year population, respectively. The unemployment rate, the wage ratio and 
population density are lagged by one year. The unemployment rate and the wage ratio are lagged by one year. Entrepreneurs, Roman Catholics, retirees, university educated and 
the Romany minority are expressed as the percentage of district population. Employment in the industry and agriculture is the percentage of total employment.   22 
Table 3 Determinants of Inter-regional Migration: Slovakia 1992 - 1996 
  Inflows  Outflows  Net Inflows  Inflows  Outflows  Net Inflows  Inflows  Outflows  Net Inflows 
  (10)    (11)    (12)    (13)    (14)    (15)    (16)    (17)    (18)   
Constant  0.019  (0.10)  0.481 (3.23)  -0.464  (2.57) -0.080  (0.54)  0.444  (3.47) -0.526  (3.15)  -0.895 (4.21)  0.174  (1.03) -1.077  (4.90) 
Unempl. Rate (lagged)  -0.004  (1.13)  -0.001 (0.27)  -0.003  (1.37) -0.004  (1.74)  -0.001  (0.33) -0.003  (1.60)  -0.006 (2.29)  0.000  (0.15) -0.006  (2.18) 
Wage Ratio (lagged)  0.878  (5.37)  0.428 (3.25)  0.451  (2.74) 0.957  (5.08)  0.298  (2.00) 0.664  (3.73)  0.562 (3.20)  0.263  (1.58) 0.305  (1.92) 
Population Density [log]          0.000  (0.02)  0.031  (2.03) -0.032  (1.35)  0.006 (0.22)  0.077  (3.82) -0.072  (3.23) 
Suburb          0.547  (7.92)  0.388  (12.68) 0.156  (3.02)  0.499 (7.67)  0.323  (9.12) 0.173  (3.57) 
Entrepreneurs                    0.043 (3.78)  0.013  (1.45) 0.030  (3.19) 
Industrial Employment                    0.005 (2.14)  -0.004  (2.68) 0.008  (4.11) 
Agricult. Employment                    0.007 (3.55)  0.000  (0.14) 0.007  (4.50) 
University Educated                    0.017 (2.01)  -0.018  (2.33) 0.035  (5.06) 
Catholics                    -0.001 (0.99)  -0.002  (2.53) 0.001  (0.98) 
Retirees                    0.038 (10.55)  0.020  (5.93) 0.018  (4.89) 
Hungarian Minority                    0.001 (0.77)  -0.002  (3.81) 0.002  (4.04) 
Romany Minority                    0.026 (3.67)  -0.002  (0.32) 0.028  (3.36) 
Dummy 1993  -0.001  (0.03)  -0.103 (3.37)  0.101  (2.84) 0.002  (0.05)  -0.108  (4.52) 0.110  (3.15)  -0.018 (0.58)  -0.109  (5.25) 0.092  (3.08) 
Dummy 1994  -0.102  (2.23)  -0.253 (7.65)  0.149  (4.59) -0.100  (2.82)  -0.255  (10.85) 0.154  (4.87)  -0.098 (3.93)  -0.256  (12.04) 0.158  (6.41) 
Dummy 1995  -0.191  (4.12)  -0.309 (9.20)  0.118  (3.95) -0.187  (5.26)  -0.313  (13.12) 0.125  (4.34)  -0.188 (7.12)  -0.315  (14.48) 0.128  (5.49) 
Dummy 1996  -0.200  (4.17)  -0.319 (10.11)  0.119  (3.44) -0.197  (5.56)  -0.323  (14.26) 0.127  (3.92)  -0.206 (7.22)  -0.325  (15.64) 0.119  (4.57) 
Adj. R
2  0.277    0.507   0.157  0.571    0.734  0.219    0.737   0.787  0.436   
Notes: Number of observations: 190 (38 districts, average population 141,300 in 1995). T -statistics (heteroskedasticity robust) are reported in parentheses. The dependent 
variables are the gross inflow and outflow rates and net inflow rate as a percentage of the region’s end-year population, respectively. The unemployment rate and wage ratio are 
lagged by one year. Entrepreneurs, Roman Catholics, retirees, university educated and national minorities are expressed as the percentage of district population. Employment in 
the industry and agriculture is the percentage of total employment. 
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Table 4 Determinants of Inter-regional Migration: Poland 1992–1993 and 1996–1997 
  Inflows  Outflows  Net Inflows  Inflows  Outflows  Net Inflows  Inflows  Outflows  Net Inflows 
          (1)            (2)            (3)   
Constant  1.342 (7.89)  1.637  (9.62)  -0.541 -4.90 2.049  (14.35)  2.450 (20.91)  -0.760  -6.97 2.253  (7.66)  2.296  (9.14) 0.026  0.24 
Unempl. Rate (lagged)  0.018 (6.21)  0.022  (7.34)  -0.009 -5.25 0.003  (1.36)  0.005 (2.52)  -0.005  -2.52 0.001  (0.48)  0.005  (1.95) -0.008  -6.09 
Wage Ratio (lagged)  -0.221 (1.49)  -0.503  (3.49)  0.591 6.13 0.714  (5.42)  0.571 (5.29)  0.301  3.34 0.690  (4.31)  0.754  (6.17) -0.141  -2.38 
Population density [log]         -0.307  (16.07)  -0.353 (20.17)  0.095  7.03 -0.297  (9.83)  -0.296  (10.83) 0.001  0.09 
Entrepreneurs [%]                  -0.014  (0.82)  -0.024  (1.74) 0.017  2.75 
Industrial Employment                  -0.004  (0.99)  -0.008  (2.10) 0.007  4.21 
Agricult. Employment                  -0.003  (1.50)  -0.004  (2.02) 0.000  0.42 
University Educated                -0.009  (1.07)  -0.024  (3.40) 0.032  8.14 
Retirees                  0.007  (0.92)  0.017  (2.50) -0.020  -6.82 
Dummy 1993  -0.098 (2.29)  -0.173  (3.88)  0.016 0.76 -0.065  (2.40)  -0.135 (5.45)  0.006  0.31 -0.062  (2.27)  -0.135  (5.93) 0.014  1.19 
Dummy 1996  -0.228 (5.50)  -0.311  (7.17)  0.051 2.41 -0.167  (5.94)  -0.241 (9.19)  0.032  1.64 -0.160  (5.57)  -0.241  (9.44) 0.047  3.98 
Dummy 1997  -0.270 (6.94)  -0.298  (7.12)  0.040 1.94 -0.237  (8.17)  -0.260 (10.44)  0.030  1.52 -0.233  (7.96)  -0.260  (10.74) 0.037  2.89 
Adj. R
2  0.288   0.377    0.372 0.663    0.781   0.478  0.658    0.807  0.812   
Notes: Number of observations:  (49 districts, average population 788,600 in 1996). T-statistics (heteroskedasticity robust) are reported in parentheses. The dependent variable is 
the net inflow rate as a percentage of the region’s end-year population. The unemployment rate and wage ratio are lagged by one year. The entrepreneurs, retirees, industrial 
employment and agricultural employment refer to 1993, population density is as of 1994 and the percentage of district residents with university degree is as of 1996. 
Entrepreneurs, retirees and university educated are expressed as the percentage of district population. Employment in the industry and agriculture is the percentage of total 
employment.  
Data for 1994 and 1995 were not available. Results obtained with separate regressions over 1992-93 and 1996-97 were similar to those above and are therefore not reported.  
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Table 5 Determinants of Inter-regional Migration: Hungary 1994–1998  
  Net Inflows  Net Inflows  Net Inflows 
  (1)    (2)    (3)   
Constant  2.364  4.51  0.685 3.48  0.877  2.10 
Unempl. Rate (lagged)  -0.065  -5.11  -0.025 -5.75  -0.040  -8.56 
Wage Ratio (lagged)  -1.668  -3.95  0.832 2.62  0.680  1.99 
Population Density [log]      -0.254 -7.31  0.002  0.03 
Dummy Pest      1.418 27.49  1.124  10.29 
Entrepreneurs [%]          -0.004  -0.41 
Industrial Employment          -0.001  -0.17 
Agricult. Employment          0.002  0.25 
University Educated          -0.101  -2.06 
Retirees          -0.021  -1.94 
Dummy 1995  -0.085  -0.86  -0.021 -0.54  -0.047  -1.14 
Dummy 1996  -0.121  -1.19  -0.043 -1.03  -0.071  -1.61 
Dummy 1997  -0.066  -0.63  0.002 0.05  -0.021  -0.51 
Dummy 1998  -0.103  -0.93  -0.015 -0.39  -0.041  -1.04 
Adj. R
2  0.210    0.888   0.906   
Notes: Number of observations: 100 (20 districts, average population 512,300 in 1995). T -statistics 
(heteroskedasticity robust) are reported in parentheses. The dependent variable is the net inflow rate as a 
percentage of the region’s end-year population. The unemployment rate and wage ratio are lagged by one year. 
The entrepreneurs, retirees, industrial employment and agricultural employment refer to 1995, while the 
population density is as of 1994. Entrepreneurs, retirees and university educated are expressed as the percentage 
of district population. Employment in the industry and agriculture is the percentage of total employment.  
 
Table 6 Determinants of Inter-regional Migration: Lithuania 1997–1999 
  Gross Inflow  Gross Outflow  Net Inflow 
  (1)    (2)    (3)   
Constant  2.936  (10.17)  2.410  (9.99)  0.527  (3.09) 
Unempl. Rate (lagged)  -0.107  (0.96)  -0.066  (0.71)  -0.041  (0.63) 
Wage Ratio (lagged)  70.074  (0.86)  50.640  (0.74)  19.434  (0.41) 
Population Density [log]  -0.123  (3.65)  -0.040  (1.43)  -0.083  (4.17) 
Suburb  0.506  (3.97)  0.229  (2.15)  0.277  (3.68) 
Dummy 1998  -0.435  (1.82)  -0.351  (1.75)  -0.084  (0.60) 
Dummy 1999  -0.468   -0.507   0.040  
Adj. R
2  0.298   0.228   0.186  
Notes: Number of observations: 168 (56 districts, average population 66,300 in 1996). T -statistics 
(heteroskedasticity robust) are reported in parentheses. The dependent variables are the gross inflow and outflow 
rates and the net inflow rate, as percentages of the region’s end-year population. The unemployment rate, wage 
ratio and population density are lagged by one year.  
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Table 7 Determinants of Inter-regional Migration: Italy 1984-1995 
  Gross Inflow  Gross Outflow  Net Inflow 
  (1)    (2)    (3)   
Constant  0.756  (4.41)  0.683  (3.55)  0.073  (0.53) 
Unempl. Rate (lagged)  -0.006  (2.26)  0.018  (5.99)  -0.023  (13.16) 
Wage Ratio (lagged)  0.785  (5.57)  0.100  (0.56)  0.684  (5.78) 
Population Density [log]  -0.170  (7.25)  -0.076  (3.58)  -0.094  (7.17) 
R
2  0.401   0.241   0.645  
Notes: Number of observations: 219 (20 regions, average population 2,863,400 in 1995). The observation for 
Valle d'Aosta in 1994 was dropped because of missing data; all observations pertaining to 1990 were dropped 
because of data problems. T -statistics (heteroskedasticity robust) are reported in parentheses. The dependent 
variables are the gross inflow and outflow rates and the net inflow rate, as percentages of the region’s end-year 
population. The unemployment rate, wage ratio and population density are lagged by one year.  
 
Table 8 Determinants of Inter-regional Migration: Spain 1984-1994 
  Gross Inflow  Gross Outflow  Net Inflow 
  (1)    (2)    (3)   
Constant  11.298  (6.35)  9.647  (5.15)  1.650  (1.04) 
Unempl. Rate (lagged)  -0.113  (2.40)  -0.058  (1.35)  -0.055  (1.63) 
Wage Ratio (lagged)  -3.132  (1.97)  -0.267  (0.16)  -2.865  (2.18) 
Population Density [log]  -0.084  (0.40)  -0.589  (2.83)  0.505  (3.03) 
R
2  0.045   0.062   0.045  
Notes: Number of observations: 187 (17 regions, average population 2,293,650 in 1994). Observations for  Ceuta 
y Melilla were dropped. T -statistics (heteroskedasticity robust) are reported in parentheses. The dependent 
variables are the gross inflow and outflow rates and the net inflow rate, as percentages of the region’s end-year 
population. The unemployment rate, wage ratio and population density are lagged by one year.  
 
Table 9 Determinants of Inter-regional Migration: Portugal 1987-1992 
  Gross Inflow  Gross Outflow  Net Inflow 
  (1)    (2)    (3)   
Constant  -0.786  (1.36)  2.583  (2.54)  -3.369  (2.93) 
Unempl. Rate (lagged)  -0.026  (2.22)  0.081  (1.22)  -0.107  (1.67) 
Wage Ratio (lagged)  2.692  (4.01)  -1.487  (0.93)  4.179  (2.41) 
Population Density [log]  -0.278  (4.07)  -0.240  (1.41)  -0.0378  (0.22) 
R
2  0.446   0.364   0.394  
Notes: Number of observations: 32 (7 regions, average population 1,408,610 in 1992). Several observations 
pertaining to 1987 and 1988 were dropped because of missing wage or unemployment data. T -statistics 
(heteroskedasticity robust) are reported in parentheses. The dependent variables are the gross inflow and outflow 
rates and the net inflow rate, as percentages of the region’s end-year population. The unemployment rate, wage 
ratio and population density are lagged by one year.  
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Table 10 Determinants of Inter-regional Migration: Netherlands 1989–1995 
  Gross Inflow  Gross Outflow  Net Inflow 
  (1)    (2)    (3)   
Constant  5.921  (3.11)  5.886  (3.07)  0.037  (0.05) 
Unempl. Rate (lagged)  0.070  (2.47)  0.044  (1.61)  0.026  (2.28) 
Wage Ratio (lagged)  -3.410  (1.89)  -3.397  (1.74)  -0.014  (0.02) 
Population Density [log]  -0.217  (2.82)  -0.182  (2.25)  -0.036  (1.43) 
Adj. R
2  0.174   0.097   0.115  
Notes: Number of observations: 77 (11 provinces, average population 1,378,300 in 1995). All observations for 
Flevoland were dropped because of data problems. T -statistics (heteroskedasticity robust) are reported in 
parentheses. The dependent variables are the gross inflow and outflow rates and the net inflow rate, as 
percentages of the region’s end-year population. The unemployment rate, wage ratio and population density are 
lagged by one year.  
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